Your Mind And Body Are Clearly Distinct Philosophy Essay

Your Mind And Body Are Clearly limpid Philosophy Es rangeDuring his meditations, Descartes starts by doubting e rattlingthing unless it back be indubitably issuen to be true. After much questioning and scepticism, Descartes comes to the conclusion I am, I exist.2This seems to state that the I Descartes describes (usu in all(prenominal)y defined as the conscious attend) essential exist for an individual to exist. Because for every time the I makes the above proposition, the forefront or conscious self is engaged in thought and wherefore demonstrates its own existence.After conclusively grounding his existence, Descartes inquires as to what makes up a person. He eventually deduces that I am non more(prenominal) than a thing that thinks3. Because to assume that his organic structure exists is to rely on his senses that could be deceived. whence through intellect al mavin, Descartes concludes that he must be essentially a thing that thinks. When returning to the contemplati on of the headland and personify in his 6th Meditation, Descartes then asserts that I that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am, is entirely and absolutely trenchant from my luggage compartment, and weed exist without it.4How and why he goes from a opinion thing, to a judging distinct from carcass is a perplexing problem both for Descartes and for his critics. In both the Second meditation, tho more clearly in part four of his Discourse on the Method Descartes presents what is commsolely known as the ancestry from doubt I saw that I could bear that I had no body, and that on that point was no world nor place where I might be but however I could not for all that conceive that I was not. On the contrary, I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the justice of separate things, it very evidently and certainly followed that I was on the other hand if I had only ceased from intellection, even if all the rest of what I had ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason for intellection that I had existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole mall or spirit of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no neediness of any place, nor does it depend on any material things so that this me, that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.5This parametric quantity ignore be displayed as such(prenominal)6I can doubt that I have a body.I cannot doubt that I exist.Ergo, I am not a body.7 at that place have been many famous refutations of this argument from doubt. One problem with the argument, forwarded by Norman Malcolm, is that arguments using the selfsame(prenominal) logic can be form that lead to ridiculous results. For exampleI can doubt that the agent of the pamphlet Why I Am Not a Christian existsI cannot doubt that Bertrand Russell existsErg o, Bertrand Russell is not the author of that pamphlet.8However as Malcolm himself points out, this counter-example is base on contingent propositions, whereas Descartes argument is intended to be based on a priori propositions. But whether the subject of the proof is a posteriori or a priori, the reasoning behind the proof can still be called into question.Descartes can think of his mind without his body, but this does not necessarily hateful that this is the case, that without his body his mind can still exist. In this form of reasoning, Descartes is attempting to use Leibnizs law of the indiscernibility of identicals. However Leibnizs law states that no two objects have exactly the same properties.9Therefore, if it is true that two things (the body and the self) have various properties, then they cannot be the i same thing and there must be diverse objects. But it is misinterpreted to say that if one believes that two things have different properties then they cannot be ide ntical. This is because what people know or think they know about an object, is not a property of that object. Therefore when Descartes claims that he doubts his body exists, this does not mean that the body has a different property than if he did not doubt its existence. He withal claims he cannot doubt that his mind exists, but if his mind is a part of his body then we can doubt that his mind, apart from the body could exist. For the doubt argument to work, Descartes needs a provable reason for us to think that the mind and the body are truly distinct.The second argument Descartes employs is often referred to as the argument from conceivability. It is also presented in the sixth meditation and through it Descartes sets out to put up that one can exist as a intellection thing distinct from the material body it goes as follows I know that all things which I peck clearly and distinctly can be buildd by perfection as I grind them, it suffices that I am able to apprehend one t hing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be certain that the one is different from the other, since they may be do to exist in seperation at least by the omnipotence of GodI justifiedly conclude that my encumbrance consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing (or a substance whose whole nerve center or nature is to think). And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in a moment) I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and un broad thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extend and thoughtlessly thing, it is certain that this I (that is to say my soul by which I am what I am), is entirely and absolutly distinct from my body, and can exist without it.10This argument can also be split into three separateI can clearly and distinctly conceive of myself existing (as a thinking thing) apart from my physical body.Anything I discern clearly and distinctly is logically possible.If I can clearly and distinctly perceive of myself as an unextended thinking thing, and my body as an extended unthinking thing, then it is logically possible that my body and my mind can exist apart.One axiomatic objection to this argument is that just because one can perceive of themselves as existing without physical properties, does not mean that they do exist without physical properties.11Another problem is that the second premise seems to be rather weak. To perceive virtuallything clearly and distinctly is not necessarily the same as it organism logically possible. Descartes may be able to clearly and distinctly conceive of himself as an unextended thinking thing, and his body as an extended unthinking thing, but that does not mean he can conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing.12He may only have an incomplete understanding of his mind and his body (with the scientific advancements of the past 300 years this seems very plausible). He has not shown that thought is the sole property of the mind, other properties could still be essential for the mind to exist (such as citation). In order for Descartes to rotate the minds distinct separation from the extended body he must prove that it is impossible for the mind to be extended or to have extension as another essential property. Therefore Descartess argument from conceivability only stands up if one agrees that clear and distinct perception is all we need to have a complete knowledge of the world, and this seem a very weak conclusion to draw.Another argument posed by Descartes is the argument from divisibility. This argument tries to prove that the mind and body are clearly distinct due to their difference in divisibility. It is set out, in the Sixth Meditation, as follows I here say, in the first place, that there is a wide difference between mind and body , inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible and the mind is entirely indivisible.13He then describes this self-reliance when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entireyet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind.14Here Descartes is offering the following reasoning all extended matter is divisible, the mind is not divisible, therefore the mind is not made of extended matter.It is clear here that the second premise of the divisibility argument the mind is not divisible is problematic. There are many objections here that can be raised against the second premise, an obvious objection is the scientific bear witness has shown convincing evidence that different areas of the physical brain are liable for different mental states (memory, rational thought, language, emot ions etc). Therefore if one removed parts of the physical brain, that persons mind would most definitely be altered. This does not mean that one must reject the idea that thoughts cannot be spatially mapped, tho that the brain in which they are contained and processed can be spatially and physically altered, and that this alteration would have a direct effect on the state of the mind. The only way that the divisibility argument can plausible is if one believes the second premise, that the mind is an immaterial substance distinct from both the body and the brain. This is highly improbable and would oppose everything that has been discovered by scientifically canvas the brain.This conclusion leads on to the biggest objection to the Cartesian claim that the mind and body are clearly distinct. How can an immaterial mind, distinct and separate from all other matter, interact with the physical body? This is the brick wall that Cartesian dualism runs up against. And there has been no con vincing answer, from Descartes to the present. It is more common now for philosophers to talk of the mental and the physical as two aspects of one reality. Indeed, one could go a step further and argue why have a maven entity? The mind or self is not a single thing, a unified identity that travels from cradle to grave, but merely a catch all label for our swirling fragmentary perceptions of the world and reactions to it. The reason we create this self, an inner puppeteer directing our behaviour, is due to our ability to view ourselves from the outside. After all isnt this what consciousness is, to be self aware? Personally I set about R.A. Brooks description of robot behaviour much more plausible, when thinking about the immaterial self so elusive to Descartes15 It is only the reviewer of the cock who imputes a central representation or central control. The creature itself has none it is a collection of competing behaviours. Out of the local chaos of their interactions there em erges, in the eye of the observer, a coherent pattern of behaviour.16